Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT by Hildreth, Virginia R.
Chicago Journal of International Law 
Volume 14 Number 2 Article 10 
1-1-2014 
Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT 
Virginia R. Hildreth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil 
Recommended Citation 
Hildreth, Virginia R. (2014) "Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT," Chicago Journal of International 
Law: Vol. 14: No. 2, Article 10. 
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol14/iss2/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please 
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu. 
Renewable Energy Subsidies and the GATT
Virginia R. Hildreth*
Abstract
Renewable energy is an increasingly important topic in today's global world and
markeqlace. This Comment analyzes the current World Trade Organization plan for
addressing renewable energy and proposes an alternate solution to thatplan modeled on the
Agreement on Agriculture. This Comment notes how, with thepresent lack of a specific WITO
agreement on renewable energy, these subsidies must be treated like all other industrial
subsidies, despite their environmental benefits. Current WUTO exceptions for environmentally
beneficialprograms require relatively pure environmental motives in order to be exempt, and
thus do not embrace subsidies with a developmentalfocus. This Comment specfically addresses
how this approach negatively impacts the ability of developing countries in particular to both
meet their energy demands and act in an environmentally conscious way, as the current
approach requires pure environmental motives without. The proposed renewable energy
agreement is modeled on the Agreement on Agriculture, with different levels ofpermissibilioy
that balance a program's benefit to the environment with its anticompetilive effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world of limited resources, renewable energy is increasingly important
on the global stage. Developing countries, such as China, have increased their
investment in renewable energy technology in order to reduce their dependence
on fossil fuels and advance their economies.' More developed countries, such as
the United States, are also interested in this sector for reasons that include
environmental issues, job creation, and energy independence.2 While there is
private involvement in these industries, government support can be necessary
for realizing such large-scale investments.' Moreover, as countries become
financially involved with the private sector actors in these industries, their
governments' support thereof can implicate international agreements on free
trade. The fact that current international trade law does not have a tailored
treatment for renewable energy creates difficulties when countries look to invest
in these technologies. Importantly, developing countries suffer the greatest
difficulties under the current scheme because of international law's focus on
encouraging principles of free trade and therefore only permitting subsidization
of programs whose sole focus is environmental preservation. China's creation of
various renewable energy programs shows the inherent conflict between the
existing World Trade Organization (WTO) regime and the twenty-first century's
unquenchable demand for energy.
This Comment will first discuss the emergence of renewable energy in the
global economy, focusing on examples in China and the United States. It will
then explain how WTO agreements currently address the issue, and discuss the
problems facing countries that attempt to support their domestic renewable
energy industries under this framework. Finally, this Comment will propose the
creation of a new WTO agreement on renewable energy modeled after the
Agreement on Agriculture's box system.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY INDUSTRIES
Renewable energy industries are not isolated to either the developed or
developing world. But a country's development status does impact how
I China Unveils Big Renewable Energy Ambitions for 2013, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.smh.com.au/business/carbon-economy/china-unveils-big-renewable-energy-
ambitions-for-2013-20130109 -2cfdd.html.
2 Ryan Galloway, WhatObama's ReelectionMeans ForGreen Energy, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2013, 10:15 AM),
http://www. fbrbes.com/sites/bmoharrisbank/2013/01/09/what -obamas-reelection-means-for-
green-energy/.
3 Alex Perera, Tara Parthasarathy, & SiddarthanBalasubramania, 5 Reasons India Needs A Green Power
Purchasing Group, WORLD RESOURCES INST. INSIGHTS (Jan. 9, 2013), http://insights.wri.org/news/
2013/01/5-reasons-india-needs-green-power-purchasing-group.
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important renewable energy is to the country because developed and developing
countries have different energy infrastructures, needs, and priorities. 4
Developing countries such as China are potentially focused on renewable energy
as a vital cost-saving mechanism to help them continue developing, whereas
developed countries such as the United States may see it as more of an
environmental issue. The WTO's prioritization of one worldview over the other
in its policies is therefore extremely important when considering how different
countries think about these issues.
A. Chinese Support of Renewable Energy
China is extremely dedicated to expanding its renewable energy capabilities.
In 2011, 65 percent of its energy was coal-based.5 As a developing country,
China's energy costs are large, and thus China has made renewable energy an
important focus in order to reduce the amount it spends on energy. The national
government identified seven strategic industries in its twelfth Five-Year Plan,
one of which is new energy, a category that includes nuclear energy, wind
energy, solar energy, and biomass energy.6 China's strategy involves developing
"national champions," or local companies that dominate global competitors in
the domestic marketplace.7 To this end, non-Chinese companies are often
concerned about the legality of the government's financial support to the extent
that it can affect their ability to compete.8 The opacity of the government's
financial assistance creates problems in quantifying how much government aid is
going to which programs.9 Industry experts in the United States consider hidden
subsidies "a key reason that Chinese exports undercut prices in the United States
4 Ernst & Young, Renewable Energy County Attractiveness Indices, 35 ERNsT & YOUNG 3-7 (Nov.
2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/CAI-issue-35_Nov-2012/
$FILE/CAI_issue-35_Nov-2012_DE0372.pdf (last visited Oct 9, 2013) [hereinafter Ernst &
Young 35].
5 Furkan Dinger, The Analysis on Photovoltaic Electricity Generation Status, Potential and Policies
of the Leading Countries in Solar Energy, 15 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REvS. 713,
718 (2011).
6 Yao Lu, China Releases 12th Five-Year Planfor National Strategic Emerging Industries, C IINA BRIEFING
(July 25, 2012), available at http://www.china-briefing.com/news/201 2/07/25/china -releases-
12th- five-year-plan- for-national-strategic-emerging-industries.html.
7 Javade Chaudhri, Chinese Industrial Policies: Indigenous Innovation, Intellectual Property Rights,
and the Trade Issues of the Next Decade, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 1, 19-21 (2011); Scott
Livingston and William J. Friedman, China Policy: Renewable Energy and China's Five-Year
Plans, US-CHINA MARKET REv. 21 (Spring 2012).
8 Livingston & Friedman, supra note 7.
9 Chaudhri, supra note 7.
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and gain market share."'" China's renewable energy sector is uniquely interesting
because most large industries are state-owned enterprises supported by the
national government and thus receive large amounts of government support."
Other countries' support of renewable energy industries usually focuses on
financial assistance but do not have as much control as China's government.
China's financial support generally includes subsidies, favorable tax
policies, pricing mechanisms, and rewards.' 2 For example, in past programs,
China has reduced corporate income taxes, reduced value added taxes, provided
other tax incentives, used feed-in tariffs, implemented research and development
incentives, and created subsidies for energy conservation technologies
improvement. 3 This financial support is distributed over a number of stages in
the industry, including overhead costs, research and development, and local
projects."4 Different types of support may be used for different industries and to
varying degrees, and not all industries are treated equally. ' A specific example is
the Renewable Energy Act of 2005, which promotes development and
production of renewable energy technologies.16 This legislation funds both
research and actual construction of renewable energy projects, demonstrating
the different ways governments can become financially involved with this type
of development.'" Going forward, China will continue its significant financial
support of renewable energy by implementing an eleven billion dollar stimulus
plan to assist the ailing solar energy industry.' 8
B. The United States and Renewable Energy
The U.S. government also provides a significant amount of assistance to
domestic renewable energy industries. The federal government provided sixteen
10 Id.
11 RichardJ. Campbell, Cong. Research Serv., R41287, China and the United States-A Comparison
of Green Energy Programs and Policies 3 (June 14, 2010).
12 The State Advances, THIE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6-12 2012, at 64 available athttp://www.economist
.com/node/21564274.
13 KPMG Int'l, Taxes and incentives for renewable energy 17-19 (June 2012).
14 CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 10.
15 Id. at 11-12.
16 Nan Sato, Note, Red Dragon Gone Green: China's Approach to Renewable Energy
Technologies, its Legal Implications, and its Impact on U.S. Energy Policy, 2011 U. Iu,. J. L.
TECH. & POL'Y. 463, 470 (2011).
17 Id.
18 Laura He, China's Government To the RescueAs Solar Crisis Deepens, FORBES (Oct. 31,2012,5:05 PM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/laurahe/2012/10/31/chinas-govemment-to-the-rescue-as-solar-
crisis-deepens/.
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billion dollars in renewable energy subsidies in 2011 alone. 9 However, because
renewable energy is not as fundamentally tied to the United States' progress as in
China, the national government has not prioritized renewable energy to the same
extent.
While federal assistance is more centralized than a collection of states'
policies, it can also be unstable because of the periodic budget negotiations that
threaten to reduce or eliminate this type of support. 20 This has real market
consequences, as investment can slow or freeze until the budget is finalized. 21
Investors also prefer low-risk, conventional technologies that can be built
quickly instead of long-term, innovative technologies that would be riskier.'
Therefore, government assistance is often key to encourage investment in
industries like renewable energy. This makes Congress's recent actions especially
troubling to the U.S. renewable energy industry, because while Congress
extended production tax credits as part of the recent fiscal cliff deal, it has only
been renewed for a year and its future is still tenuous.23 Other tax credits for
solar energy expire at the end of 2016, and geothermal and biomass tax credits
expire at the end of 2013.24 There is some state-level financial support of
renewable energy, but it is not very coordinated with federal incentives, so rather
than being an efficient addition it is more of a "patchwork of varied and volatile
policies."25 This reduces its appeal to investors,2 6 especially as compared to the
Chinese approach.
19 Steve Hargreaves, Energy Subsidies Total$24 Billion, Most to Renewables, CNNMoNEY (Mar. 7, 2012,
1:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/07/news/economy/energy-subsidies/index.htm.
20 David G. Victor & Kassia Yanosek, The Crisis in Clean Energy: Stark Realities of tbe Renewables Craze,
90 FOREIGN AFF. 112, 114 (2011).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 115; Clifton Yin, Assessing the Wind Production Tax Credit, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Jan. 8,
2013), http://theenergycollective.com/cliftonyin/ 167936/assessing-wind-production-tax -credit.
23 American Taxpayer ReliefActof 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 405, 126 Stat. 2313 (2013); Yin,
supra note 22. More recently, a 2.2-cent per kilowatt-hour PTC lapsed at the end of 2012. Steve
Goreham, A Subsidy That's Blowin' in the Wind, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2012, available at http://
communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cimatism-watching-climate-science/2012/
nov/26/subsidy-s-blowin-wind/. It was renewed in 2013 for two years at 2.3 cents per kilowatt-
hour. Christopher Martin, U.S. Wind Set to Rebound as Lobby Pursues Tax Credit, BLOOMBERG, May
6,2013, available athttp://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-06/u-s-wind-industry-poised-for-
rebound-as-lobby-seeks- tax -credit.html.
24 See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2012); Ernst & Young, Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Indices, 33 ERNST
& YOUNG 25 (May 2012), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Renewable
_energy-count ryattractivenessindices_-_Issue_33/$FILE/EYRECAI_issue_33.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Ernst & Young 33].
25 Victor & Yanosek, supra note 20, at 115.
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The U.S. government uses tax incentives as a significant tool for
encouraging renewable energy investment. The Production Tax Credit (PTC)
created in 1992 is an important example, and the credit's amount is connected to
how much electricity the product produces. 27 PTCs have impacted the domestic
industry and led to a wind energy boom.28 The use of tax incentives in particular
significantly affects the structure of the renewable energy industry in the United
States. The type of incentive impacts the type of investor that can take on the
project. 29 Nonrefundable tax credits are attractive to investors with resources at
the outset, such as large corporations and wealthy individuals. 3 Monetary grants
or direct subsidies allow for investors without large amounts of cash. In order
for a producer to use the PTCs it earns, it must have federal tax liabilities and
only the owner can claim them."
The United States also supports these programs through loan guarantees.
This approach is not always successful. Solyndra, a solar power company in the
United States, went bankrupt in 2011 despite over half a million dollars in
federal loan guarantees. 3 2 Solyndra's failure opened President Obama and his
support of renewable energy programs to increased criticism and put the future
of federal support of renewable energy projects in jeopardy.33 In April 2012,
however, the Department of Energy said that it would continue issuing
conditional loan guarantees for clean energy projects, despite Solyndra's
bankruptcy.' 4
These examples show that while the U.S. government does support
renewable energy technology, it approaches this support from a very different
26 Diane Cardwell, RenewedTaxCreditBuqys Wind-Power Priects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,2013, available a
http://www.nyimes.com/2013/03/22/business/energy-environment/a-tax-credits-renewal-bfts-
wind-projects.htmlr=1&gwh=E9A33B4C439627685128F385290F1AD6&.
27 Jeffrey Ball, Tough Love for Renewable Energy: Making Wind and Solar Power Affordable, 91
FOREIGN Aim. 122, 127 (2012).
28 Miguel Mendon a, Stephen Lacey, & Frede Hvelplund, Stability, Participation and Transparency
in Renewable Energy Policy: Lessons from Denmark and the United States, 27 POL'Y & Soc'Y
379, 381-82 (Mar. 2009).
29 Id. at 381.
30 Id.
31 Geoffrey Heal, The Economics of Renewable Energy 11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15081, 2009).
32 Maria Gallucci, So/yndra Shakeout Seen as a Sign of Success for Wider Solar Market, INSIDECLIMATE
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20110920/solyndra-solar-energy-
market-success-loan-guarantees-republicans-department-of-energy-doe-obama.
33' Andrew Restuccia, Ta, 5 Energy Issues to Remember in 2012, POLITICO (Dec. 28, 2012, 4:47 AM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/1 2 /top- five-energy-issues-to-remember-in-2012-
85538.html.
34 Ernst & Young 33, supra note 24, at 25.
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place than China. The United States' support of renewable energy is because of
its environmental impact and, to a lesser extent, the pursuit of inexpensive,
domestic energy. But it is not as fundamentally important to developing the
nation's economy as it is in China.
III. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The major goal of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a global
organization composed of member states, is to open trade between nations.3" Its
vanous agreements cover goods, services, and intellectual property.36 WTO
members create the agreements themselves through negotiation rounds, and the
WTO body of rules has evolved over time.
The WTO has 159 members, including economic powerhouses such as the
United States and China.3" WTO agreements include rules that apply to trade
amongst members generally. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) is the core of the WTO and limits member states' ability to restrict
imports.38 While the original GATT was passed in 1947, it has since been
modified and expanded considerably.3 9 The GATT "is built around the idea that
tariffs should be the sole mechanism for countries to restrict imports, with other
provisions meant to protect the integrity of the tariff regime. ' 4' There are also a
number of specific agreements that provide special rules and guidance for
certain areas of trade. There are a number of these specific agreements, including
the Agreement on Agriculture.41 The Agreement on Agriculture is an agreement
designed to take into account the special nature of agricultural economies and
the important role governmental subsidization plays in these industries.42
There is, however, no WTO agreement about renewable energy, and as
such it is not treated differently as a broad category. The Doha negotiation
35 About the VTO-A Statement by the Director-General Pascal Lamy, WORLD TRAD. ORGANIZATION,
available at http://wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/wto dg__stat-e.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2013).
36 The WTO, Understanding the WTO 10 (5th ed. 2011).
37 Members and Observers, WORlM TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at http://www.wto.org/engish/
thewto.e/whatis-e/ti fe/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
38 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GAT1].
39 David A. Gantz, World Trade Law after Doha: Multilateral, Regional, and National Approaches,
40 DENV.J. INT'l. L. & Poi.'y 321, 325 (2011-2012).
40 Sanford E. Gaines, Considering WTI"O Law in the Design of Climate Change Regimes Beyond Kyoto, 8 IOP
CONF. SERIES: EARTH AND ENV'T SC. 1, 2 (2009).
41 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
42 UNDERSTANDING TIlE WTO, siqpra note 36, at 26.
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round that began in 2001 included discussions about eliminating tariff and non-
tariff barriers for renewable energy products and services.43 Potential proposals
included the United States' standstill agreement to impose a "freeze" on green
tariff lines.' The Doha round is "effectively dead" because the talks broke down
and have not been resuscitated,4" so renewable energy still has no special
exceptions under WTO agreements. Until such an agreement happens,
renewable energy subsidies will be generally subject to the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) unless they fall under
the auspices of a separate, specialized agreement.
A. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The SCM Agreement defines important economic terms (such as
"subsidies"), outlines restrictions on subsidies, and identifies both prohibited
and actionable subsidies.' Importantly, the SCM Agreement is not expansive, as
the WTO did not aim to prohibit subsidies in general. Indeed, it does not
disallow all subsidies, and different types of impermissible subsidies are treated
differently.4" The SCM Agreement is also very limited in terms of enforcement
mechanisms, and this can allow for member states to manipulate the rules.
Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy is defined as a financial contribution,
foregone government revenue, provision of goods or services, or a mechanism
that does one of these three actions through a private body, that is given by a
member government or territory that confers a benefit.48 In Canada-Measures
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, a WTO Panel determined that a country
confers a benefit "when it confers an advantage on the recipient relative to
applicable commercial benchmarks, i.e., when it is provided on terms that are
more advantageous than those that would be available to the recipient on the
43 Doha round briefing notes, Trade and Environment, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dda-e/status-e/envire.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013).
44 This type of proposal may disproportionately affect developing countries. Daniel Pruzin, UI7I:
Hopes Fading for IWF 'Deliverables'Dealas Delegations Take Hard Line on LDC-Plus, 28 INT'LTRADE
REP. (BNA) 1164 (July 14, 2011).
45 Gantz, supra note 39, at 321.
46 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement]; DAVID DANA, WTO LEGAL IMPACTS ON COMMODITY SUBSIDIES: GREEN Box
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE FARM BILL FOR FARM INCOME THROUGH THE CONSERVATION AND
CLEAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS 3 (Envtl. L. & Pol'y Center, 2004), http://epc.org/
wp-content/uploads/2008/06/wtolegalimpacts 200 4 l .pdf.
47 Id.
48 SCM Agreement, supra note 46, art. 1.
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market."49 Article 2 of the SCM Agreement importantly limits its restrictions to
"specific" subsidies."0 Specific subsidies are those that are specific to an industry,
enterprise, or group." The SCM's definition of a subsidy is limiting, as financial
contributions that a member country cannot prove confer a benefit are not
within the scope of the SCM Agreement, nor are subsidies that do not benefit a
specific industry. 2
The SCM Agreement outlines two types of impermissible subsidies:
prohibited and actionable. Prohibited subsidies are those spedifically designed to
distort trade, such as setting export targets or requiring domestic goods over
imported ones. 3 If the WTO finds that a member state has a prohibited subsidy,
the consequence is simply that the member state must remove it.' An example
of a subsidy that is likely prohibited is China's Ride the Wind Program, which
required local materials for the production of windmills for wind energy, because
this favors domestic windmill parts over imported ones.55 Although the program
was never fully litigated in the WTO, the program was terminated after the U.S.
Trade Representative began to investigate its legality under the WTO trade
rules.5 6 The program arguably violates the two-part SCM Agreement test because
it is both a clear financial contribution and the benefit is contingent on using
local content.5 7 Because removal is the only consequence under WTO law,
member states have limited recourse if a country develops an impermissible
program, profits from the unfair advantage, and then removes the program
before it can be litigated. 8 Although, if the WTO does reach the stage of issuing
a ruling, there are consequences such as retaliation to recoup any damage done.
If the program is withdrawn before the litigation concludes, there can be no
such retaliation without violating the rules.
49 Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 9.120, WT/DS70/R
(Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Canada-Aircraft].
50 DANA, supra note 46.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 10.
53 UNDERSrANDING TH WTO, sutpra note 36, at 45.
54 Id. at 46.
55 Kenina Lee, Note, An Inherent Conflict Between WTO Law and a Sustainable Future?
Evaluating the Consistence of Canadian and Chinese Renewable Energy Policies with WTO
Trade Law, 24 GEO. INT'L ENVTiL. L. REV. 57, 85 (2011).
56 Id. at 82.
57 Id.
58 Keith Bradsher, On Clean Energ, China Skirts Rules, N.Y. TiM ES, Sept. 9, 2010, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/business/global/09trade.htmlnpagewanted=all.
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Actionable subsidies do not have an intent requirement. Instead, there
must only be an adverse effect on another member state: injury to the domestic
industry, nullification of benefits to another signatory, or serious prejudice of the
interests of another member.5 9 This is included in the definition of a benefit as
laid out in Canada-Aircraft because the other member state is in a worse
position than it would have been.60 Serious prejudice is presumed when the total
ad valorem subsidization is more than 5 percent.6' Affected members can refer a
suspect subsidy to the Dispute Settlement Body, and if they prevail the only
remedy available is that the member states must withdraw the subsidies or alter
them so that they do not have adverse effects.62
B. Article XX
Article XX is an important part of the GATT that outlines general
exceptions to member states' obligations.63 Article XX consists of both a
chapeau and a list of possible exceptions. The purpose of the chapeau is
generally to prevent the abuse of exceptions in Article XX, and to avoid applying
Article XX to frustrate the legal obligations of right holders under the GATT.'
The chapeau notes that "[u]nilateral trade measures may be used where
necessary to protect human health or to promote conservation of natural
resources, provided that the measures do not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable
trade discrimination or serve as a disguised restriction on trade." 6 The chapeau's
language is notably restrictive and this exception cannot be liberally construed.
An important case under Article XX that shows the importance of the
chapeau is United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasol'ne (United
States-Gasoline).66 It involved the Clean Air Act and the Environmental
Protection Agency's ability to regulate and control toxic and other pollution
from gasoline manufactured or imported into the United States.67 The Appellate
Body found that the chapeau addresses the manner in which the measure is
59 SCM Agreement, supra note 46, art. 5.
60 See, Canada-Aircraft, supra note 49.
61 SCM Agreement, supra note 46, art. 6.
62 Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Allowance Trading into the Global Marketplace, 10 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 185, 205 (1999).
63 GAIT, supra note 38, art. XX.
64 Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Ap.29, 1996) [hereinafter United States-Gasoline].
65 Gaines, supra note 40, at 2.
66 United States-Gasoline, supra note 64.
67 Id. at 2.
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applied, as opposed to its contents. 68 Because of this, even a trade measure that
was completely focused on the protection of human health could be prohibited
if it was applied in a way that discriminated against or arbitrarily focused on
certain nations. For example, the reasoning in United States-Gasoline came to
bear on the case United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (United States-Shrimp). The United States wanted to protect sea turtles
and imposed a ban on shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology
that can harm sea turtles.69 The Appellate Body noted that, according to United
States-Gasoline, it should examine the way in which the United States applied this
particular restriction and then decide if it was "being abused so as to frustrate or
defeat the substantive rights of the appellees under the GATT 1994."70 The
United States' regulation was not allowed because although it "serves an
environmental objective that is recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of
Article XX of the GATT 1994, this measure has been applied by the United
States in a manner which constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination
between Members of the WTO, contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of
Article XX."7 1 The WTO found that the United States unjustifiably
discriminated against other countries because the United States required other
member nations to adopt a policy about sea turtles that was "essentially the
same," not just "comparable," thereby establishing a "rigid and unbending
standard." 2 The WTO was also skeptical because the United States excluded
shrimp "caught using methods identical to those employed in the United States"
only because the United States had not certified these countries, something the
WTO found to be "difficult to reconcile with the declared policy objective of
protecting and conserving sea turtles." 3 Because the United States did not look
at the appropriateness of each country's policies and instead held them all to a
single standard, the WTO found that the United States discriminated against
other nations.74
68 Id. at 22.
69 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, 2, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct, 12, 1998) [hereinafter United States-Shrimp].
70 Id. 39.
71 Id. 184.
72 Id. 163.
73 Id. 165.
74 The WTO adopted an expansive definition of discrimination, noting that: "We believe
discrimination results not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently
treated, but also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into
the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting
countries." Id.
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In the list of Article XX's potential exceptions, the relevant provisions are
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health""5 and
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."7 The word "necessary" in Article XX(b) is important and
restrictive. In a case dealing with a possible exception under Article XX(d), a
WTO panel held that "a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent
with another GATT provision as 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) if an
alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which
is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to it."" A later
WTO Panel used this same interpretation of "necessary" in Article XX(b) in
Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes. The Panel
held that because "there were various measures consistent with the General
Agreement which were reasonably available to Thailand to control the quality
and quantity of cigarettes smoked and which, taken together, could achieve the
health policy goals," it was not "necessary."78
An example of a program that would likely be permissible under the two
requirements is the United States' renewable portfolio standards.79 These laws
require electric power providers to have a certain percentage of their electricity
from renewable sources. 80 Even if we assume that this program is a benefit
conferred by the United States and thus harmed a member state, it would still be
permissible. First, it fits into the Article XX(g) exception because it "[relates] to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" and the measures are "made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."8' Note that this "relating" language in Article XX(g) is not as
restrictive as Article XX(b)'s "necessary" language. Second, this program does
not violate the spirit of Article XX's chapeau. The program does not arbitrarily
or unjustifiably discriminate between countries in similar conditions or act as a
disguised restriction on international trade because it focuses on the domestic
energy market and has no local content requirements that might harm other
75 GATT, supra note 38, art. XX(b).
76 Id. art. XX(g).
77 Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 5.26, L/6439-36S/345
(Nov. 7, 1989) [hereinafter United States-Section 3371.
78 Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 81,
DS1O/R-37S/200 (Nov, 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thailand-Cigarettes].
79 See Gaines, supra note 40, at 9 (noting that the programs' lack of discrimination between
technologies and products does not distort the renewable energy market).
80 Id.
81 GATT, supra note 38, at. XX(g).
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countries' contributions to this market. This program cannot be construed as
abusing the exceptions in Article XX or as an attempt to frustrate the United
States' obligations in the WTO because it is a bona fide environmental program
whose purpose is focused on the environment and unrelated to trade.82
Article XX may have potential for finding an exception for renewable
energy because of its language about the conservation of natural resources and
protecting human, animal, and plant health. But an important aspect of Article
XX is intent as well as application. Because it has these limits, this exception will
not allow as many subsidies as the Agreement on Agriculture could because it
will not allow specific subsidies or those that favor domestic products or
services. Article XX is very restrictive, and in evaluating if a policy meets these
requirements it looks to the member state's intent.
While protecting the environment may be a consideration, developing
countries are interested in renewable energy for economic reasons. 83 Renewable
energy is attractive because it can be more inexpensive than traditional forms of
energy, can be produced domestically, and can be an industry in and of itself.
Article XX is therefore unlikely to permit otherwise unallowable subsidy
programs created by China because it is making renewable energy investment
choices for economic reasons, not for the sake of conserving natural resources.
Because of the chapeau's underlying intent, current Article XX analysis will
disfavor countries that develop plans for "impure" reasons, in that they
incorporate renewable energy technology for its particular benefits in industrial
development rather than purely for environmental protection. This highlights
the difficulty developing countries face when trying to support domestic
renewable energy initiatives, because similar kinds of economic support for the
"wrong" reasons can run afoul of WTO rules.
IV. ANALYSIS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES IN THE
CURRENT WTO FRAMEWORK
Because of the importance of renewable energy in the developing world,
the lack of a specific agreement on the topic is problematic. The current regime,
dominated by the SCM Agreement and Article XX, leaves member states to
apply the rules designed for normal subsidies to the unique features of the
renewable energy industry.
Understanding the role of government subsidies in the economic
development of renewable energy is important because it shows the impact the
current WTO framework has on this development. Higher energy prices and
82 See United States-Gasoline, supra note 64, at 18-I 9.
83 See Ernst & Young 35, supra note 4, at 3.
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energy policies help incentivize the creation of renewable energy technology.'
Renewable energy development often requires large initial capital investments,
but have little or no costs after that point beyond maintenance and basic
operation.85 The technology needed for renewable energy tends to be more
expensive than traditional fuel sources.86 Governmental support is therefore
extremely important in this area, even if it is not financial. Research shows that it
is government regulation and support that is the primary reason for adopting
clean technologies, not simply the reduced cost of these new technologies.87
There are a number of different types of subsidies that can be used for
renewable energy, and the timing of the financial assistance affects what kind of
subsidy it is. For example, "direct subsidies are more often applied earlier in the
timeline of research and development (R&D) projects, while tax incentives are
generally made available later in a cycle to aid manufacturing ventures or to
encourage consumers to adopt the technologies and help to build demand."88 As
noted above, China uses a wide variety of types of subsidies, whereas the United
States' focus is mostly on taxes.89 This can have an important impact on the
general permissibility of a country's subsidies if one kind of subsidy is more
acceptable based on WTO classifications.
This section will examine a variety of subsidies and industries. It will
primarily focus on subsidies created by the Chinese government as an example
of a developing country whose renewable energy investments are tied to
industrial development. It will also consider subsidies in the United States and
other developed countries to show how renewable subsidies are different when
motivated by more environmental factors.
A. Feed-In Tariffs
Feed-in tariffs are "one of the most important and widely used policy tools
to address the problems of climate change."9 European countries used feed-in
tariffs extensively to help expand renewable energy industries, and with
governmental support, private industries were able to create "15,000 megawatts
of solar photovoltaic (PV) power and more than 55,000 megawatts of wind
84 Id.
85 Heal, supra note 31, at 4.
86 David Popp, Ivan Hascic, and Neelakshi Medhi, Technology and the Diffusion of Renewable Energy, 33
ENERGY ECON. 648,648 (uly 2011).
87 Id. at 649.
88 Campbell, supra note 11, at 2.
89 See Section 1.
90 Lee, supra note 55, at 58.
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power" between 2000 and 2009. 9' Globally, feed-in tariffs have helped create
approximately 75 percent of global solar PV power and 45 percent of global
wind power.92 Feed-in tariffs offer developers a long-term (usually ten to twenty-
five years) purchase agreement for the sale of renewable energy-derived
electricity.93 Countries can tailor these contracts depending on the type of
technology they most want to encourage, where they want these projects to take
place, as well as other details that may be domestically important in developing a
nascent renewable energy industry.94
The Canadian province of Ontario began its feed-in tariff program in 2009,
paying developers set prices for their electricity that are meant to not only cover
the expended capital and operating costs, but also provide a reasonable rate of
return.95 In order to qualify for this program, the project developers must be in
Ontario, use an eligible renewable energy resource (bioenergy, solar energy,
waterpower, or wind), and be able to connect to a local distribution system. 96
The feed-in tariff program has a domestic content requirement. 97 The Canadian
government argued that these subsidies were necessary to provide a "reasonable
return on the investment" for these costly projects.98 The obvious and significant
lack of a specific renewable energy agreement within the WTO is clearly
problematic in this instance, where the renewable energy goals of a member
state and its international trade obligations are in clear conflict.
In 2010,Japan filed a complaint against Canada related to feed-in tariffs in
a case called Canada-Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program (Canada-Feed-
In Tariff Program).99 The European Union later joined the case and also presented
evidence. 0 Japan claimed that Canada's contracts for wind and solar projects
violated WTO rules because the government's subsidies are "contingent upon
the use of domestic over imported goods, in violation of Articles 3.1 (b) and 3.2
91 Toby D. Couture et al., U.S. Dept. of Energy Nat'l Renewable Energy Laboratory, Poligymaker's
Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policy Design v (2010). available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fylOosti/
44849.pdf.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Lee, supra note 55, at 59.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Panel Report, Canada-Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, 9.23, WT/DS426/R
(Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Canada-Feed-In Tariff].
99 Lee, supra note 55, at 57.
100 Id. at 61 n.15.
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of the SCM Agreement. 1 °. A portion of Ontario's electricity market involves
competition for supply contracts through bidding, with the lowest bid that meets
certain conditions winning the contract. 102 Essentially, Japan argued that because
a subsidy that lowers costs for electricity producers who use domestic goods
over imported goods, they will have lower overall costs and will have an
advantage in submitting the lowest bid and have thus been benefited, making it a
subsidy under the SCM Agreement. °3Japan claimed that because its own similar
products received less favorable treatment because of these subsidies, this
satisfies the SCM Agreement's harm requirement.10 4
Interestingly, the Panel concluded that Canada's domestic content
requirements violated its obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures, but thatJapan and the European Union failed to establish
that these programs are subsidies as defined by the SCM Agreement because
they did not establish that they confer a benefit.0 ' This case may be helpful in
outlining the main obstacle for renewable energy and the Agreement on
Agriculture: its stringent limitations. Because it is product-based, the Agreement
on Agriculture is very limited in a case like this where even if agricultural settings
are used or if farmers are the ones producing the wind on their properties, it
does not apply. Although the parties hotly contested the issue of market
definition, the Panel had no difficulty defining the product as electricity.106 This
case again emphasizes the conflict between encouraging renewable energy
development and international trade commitments.
B. Solar Panels
Solar panels are an important source of renewable energy. They are
especially important in China, the world's largest manufacturer of solar panels.'07
Along with this production, the Chinese government continues to be supportive
of the industry domestically, recently increasing solar power capacity targets to
101 Canada-Feed-In Tariff, supra note 98, 3.1.
102 Id. 7.29.
103 Id. %3.1, 7.29.
104 Id. 3.1.
105 Much of this discussion turned on defining the market and what the market would be in the
absence of these programs. The Panel did not think that a competitive wholesale market would
exist if these programs did not exist, and thus found that comparisons of this type were not
relevant. Canada-Feed-In Tariff Program, supra note 98, 7.310, JPN-1 39 8.3, EU-1 40 8.7.
106 Canada-Feed-In Tariff spra note 98, 17.310.
107 Belinda Cao & Victoria Stilwell, Suntech Leads Solar Gains on State Goals: China Overnight,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 9,2013,3:47 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-09/trina-leads-
solars-higher-on- state-goals-china-overnight.htrr.
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ten gigawatts (up from seven)."0 8 China may redouble this in an attempt to reach
forty gigawatts by 2015 to support the local solar power industry.I°" Because of
the global overcapacity of the solar panel manufacturing market, this effort is
important for the domestic Chinese market to continue to grow."' In 2012, the
Chinese government reduced subsidies by 21 percent, from $1.11 per watt to
$0.87 per watt, for developers who use the power they generate for their own
use."' China has also recently approved subsidies for rooftop solar
installations." 2 While this particular subsidy is not production related and does
not implicate international trade agreements, it shows the central government's
commitment to the solar industry at home and abroad. Because of international
trade disputes related to anti-dumping and subsidy investigations, China's solar
export value for 2012 fell 40 percent from 2011, to only $2.08 billion."' Other
governments, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy have reduced
their own solar subsidies in part because of the inexpensiveness of China's solar
panels." 4
Solar energy sources are the dominant renewable energy source globally,
and photovoltaic (PV) systems are popular for harnessing solar power."' Solar
PV technology directly converts sunlight into electricity through solar cells. 116
When connected, these cells create a photovoltaic module.'17 In 2008, global PV
capacity was just fifteen gigawatts, though that number is increasing." 8
108 Dominique Patton, China OGW Boostfor PV Shares, RECHARGE (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.
rechargenews.com/solar/article1 313598.ece.
109 Wayne Ma, China Plans 71lo Ramp Up Solar-Power Capacit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323706704578229570073217326.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2013).
110 See id.
111 China Dims 'Golden Sun' Solar Subsidy, RENEWABLE ENERGY (May 3, 2012), http://www.renew
ableenergyw orld.com/rea/new s/article/2012/05/china-dims-golden- sun.
112 Cao & Stilwell, supra note 107.
113 Li Jiabao, Trade disputes mean tough winterforChinese exporters, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 10, 2013, 1:11 AM,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-01/10/content_16100474.htm.
114 China Dims, supra note 111.
115 Dinger, supra note 5, at 714, 719.
116 Varun, Ravi Prakash, and Inder Krishnan Bhat, Energy, economics and ennironmental impacts of renewabk
energy systems, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REv. 2716, 2718 (2009).
117 Id.
18 Dinger, supra note 5, at 714-15.
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An example of a PV subsidy program is China's Golden Sun program, its
second national solar subsidy program, established in 2009. "' Under the Golden
Sun program, the central government gives firms an investment subsidy of up to
50 percent for solar power projects. 20 In areas without a power supply, this
subsidy increases to 70 percent. 2'
These subsidies likely do not fall within the scope of Article XX's
exceptions for environmental protection. By increasing the use of solar energy
both domestically (and, with their exported solar panels, abroad), China could
argue that the Golden Sun program serves a legitimate environmental purpose.
By reducing the use of and dependence on fossil fuels, this program could be
cast as "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health"'" and
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption."" 2 But this argument, while it incorporates an argument within
the chapeau, was clearly not China's primary motivation in creating the Golden
Sun program. While the consequences of the Golden Sun program surely benefit
the environment, the intent of the program is more economical than
environmental. As noted above, the solar industry and its continued health are
important to the national economy. In United States-Gasoline, the Appellate
Body noted that the chapeau plays the important role of preventing the abuse of
these exceptions to avoid WTO obligations.2 Because the Golden Sun
program's positive environmental consequences seem to be incidental rather
than the driving purpose of the program, it is unlikely that the WTO would
permit this program. Allowing this to be an environmental exception under
Article XX would frustrate the legal obligations of right holders under the
GATT because it is merely incidental and therefore a pretext for this
argument.125
C. General Article XX Analysis
Article XX offers the most textual support for justifying programs that aim
to protect the environment despite potential adverse effects on free trade. This
119 China: Golden Sun Programme CIM4ATE CONNECT LIMITED (2010), availabk at http: / /www. climate-
connect.co.uk/Home/sites/default/files/Golden%20Sun%2Programme%/200verview/ 2OCim
ate%20Connect.pdf (last visited Nov 29, 2012).
120 Campbell, supra note 11, at 8.
121 China: Golden Sun Programme, supra note 119.
122 GATT, supra note 38, art. XX(b).
123 GAIT, supra note 38, art. XX(g).
124 United States-Gasoline, supra note 64, at 22.
125 Id. at 19.
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does not mean, however, that the text of Article XX is a blank check for any
program with a tenuous environmental link. In order to have an argument, a
country's policies must both meet a stated exception from the list in Article XX
and fall within the language of the article's chapeau.126 Luckily, there is
jurisprudence on this issue that clarifies the extent to which this exception is
available. Importantly, the jurisprudence limits the scope of the exception
considerably and reads the chapeau very strictly.127
While Article XX could be extremely helpful when member states try to
defend their subsidization of renewable energy, it is clearly incomplete. For
example, in Canada-Feed-In Tariff Program, Canada's goal of making renewable
energy a feasible alternative to, and competitive in, its domestic electricity market
would not singularly render its program acceptable under Article XX. While
Canada could argue that the feed-in tariffs are "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health"'28 and "relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption," '129 Article XX's chapeau is
an insurmountable obstacle. Much like in United States-Shrimp, the WTO would
likely find that its domestic content requirement would be an arbitrary and
unjustifiable act of discrimination between WTO members.
It is important to note that despite these notable restrictions in finding an
exception in Article XX, the WTO did not say that this could never happen.
There is still a possibility of using Article XX as a way of allowing its members
to protect the environment. In United States-Shrimp, the Appellate Body
specifically noted that it had "not decided that the protection and preservation of
the environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. 1 30
Essentially, in order to meet the requirements of Article XX, a subsidy would
first have to be necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health or be
related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 3' It would then
have to apply equally to all member states, so any type of domestic content
requirement or special treatment would not be allowed. It would also have to be
very carefully applied so that other countries could not claim that it was being
abused or used to infringe on other member states' basic rights under the
126 United States-Shrimp, supra note 69, % 15, 151, 156-57.
127 See United States-Gasoline, supra note 64, at 22.
128 GAYT, supra note 38, art. XX(b).
129 Id. art. XX (g).
130 United States -Shrimp, supra note 69, 185.
131 GAYT, supra note 38, art. XX (b), (g).
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GATT.132 In addition to these Article XX requirements, it would also have to be
specific enough to qualify as a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.
The exceptions embodied within Article XX, providing for the
conservation of natural resources and protecting human, animal, and plant
health, are the most explicit in addressing the unique circumstances of renewable
energy and its positive environmental consequences in the context of
international trade law. If the WTO does not specifically address the unique
needs of the renewable energy industry in the context of international trade law,
Article XX is likely to remain on the forefront of environmentally friendly WTO
disputes. Although the Appellate Body did not foreclose the possibility of
Article XX being used to uphold a country's environmental policies, its decisions
in United States-Gasoline and United States-Shrimp show that this is significantly
limited.
V. CREATING A MODEL FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY BASED ON
THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE
A new model for how the WTO handles renewable energy would, ideally,
not entirely rely on the environmental hook that Article XX provides. It would
recognize the economic benefits that renewable energy can provide and
encourage countries to use this technology. The fact that it benefits the
environment is often just an added benefit compared to the central focus of
providing affordable energy. However, it is important to keep in mind that
because one of the major goals of the WTO is to increase access to markets and
increase free trade,'33 these must be important considerations in any viable
proposal. This section will first describe the Agreement on Agriculture and then
discuss how a new agreement could be modeled on its box classification system.
A. The Agreement on Agriculture
The Uruguay Round of negotiations for the modernization of the GATT
from 1986 to 1994 included the creation of the Agreement on Agriculture."
The Agreement on Agriculture aims to distort trade as little as possible, while
still allowing agricultural products to receive different treatment from industrial
products. 3 ' It uses a box system to analyze different types of agricultural
132 United States-Shrimp, supra note 69, 39.
133 About the WTO, supra note 35.
134 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, spra note 36, at 26.
135 Id. at 26-27.
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subsidies on the basis of how much they are likely to distort trade. 36 This
Section explores ways in which renewable energy technologies that involve
agricultural settings could relate to the Agreement on Agriculture.
1. The box classifications.
There are three types of box classifications under the Agreement on
Agriculture: the blue box, green box, and amber box. 137 Each classifies different
types of subsidies that range in permissibility. Box categorization is challenging
because it requires classification of what a subsidy is benefiting as well as
mathematical calculations, and percentages are significant in evaluating a
program's permissibility. Despite these difficulties, box categorization helps
nations understand the broader categories of permissibility. Once a program has
been placed in a certain box, it becomes easy to evaluate. Box categorization also
permits flexibility within the context of renewable subsidies while still
establishing clear lines of permissibility. And because of the Agreement on
Agriculture, nations are already familiar with the general framework.
The blue box includes programs that involve direct spending and are
exempt if focused on specified areas. 138 Actual production is still required, but
they do not necessarily relate to the quantity.'39 These payments are linked to
supply control programs, and do not count toward the level of support that the
WTO aims to reduce. 140 There is no limit on the number of blue box programs a
country can have. "4 During negotiations, different countries were able to get
their preexisting programs placed into the blue box, so the current system is
somewhat country-specific in terms of existing programs and domestic
industries. ' For example, the Blair House agreement allowed the United States'
cereal direct payments to count as blue box payments, even though other types
of direct payments are not allowed.' The United States proposed eliminating
the blue box category during the Doha rounds; its elimination in the future
136 Anne Effland, ClassifyingandMeasuringAgricukuralStcpport: Idenifying Difflrnces Between the WfO and
OECD Systems, Econ. Info. Bull. 74 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Economic Research Service) Mar. 2011,
at iii.
137 UNDERSTANDING TIlE WTO, supra note 36, at 29.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Tim Josling & Stefan Tangermann, Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and
Developments for the Next Round of Negotiations, 26 EUR. REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 371, 377
(Apr. 1999).
141 Lars Brink, WTO Constraints on Domestic Support in Agriculture: Past and Future, 57
CANADIAN J. AGRIC. ECON. 1, 13 (Mar. 2009).
142 Josling & Tangermann, supra note 140, at 377.
143 Id.
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could be seen as a way to strengthen the WTO's agricultural uniformity in a
multilateral way by reducing these special exceptions.'"
Green box programs include those that have a minimal impact on trade;
specifically that they have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or
effects on production. 4 ' They are always permissible, with no limit on the
amount countries can spend or the number of programs they can have. 46
Unfortunately, Annex 2 does not define "trade-distorting effects or effects on
production," and there are no official rulings on its legal meaning in this
context. 147 Generally accepted green box programs do not usually relate to
production and instead deal with domestic supports such as research, disease
control, infrastructure, and food security. 148 Research and development projects
fall into this category, and are most likely to survive if "they can be shown to be
part of a bona fide environmental program," especially if the country can
document "the environmental rationale, the expected environmental benefits
and the realized environmental benefits of the payments.' 4' A bona fide
environmental program in this spirit is one with a primary purpose of benefitting
the environment. This type of program could not be tangential to a larger
industrial project because then it would affect production, which is not
permissible in the green box definition. China's Ride the Wind program, for
example, would not qualify because while the windmills have environmental
benefits, the goal of the local content requirement and industrial subsidies are
not grounded in environmental goals but industrial ones. An example of a
permitted green box program is Canada's payments to farmers. Canada has
payment programs that were created to stabilize farmers' incomes, but because
they are decoupled from output levels they do not technically support
production or distort trade and are therefore permitted as green box
payments.'is
The amber box contains domestic support measures that distort
production and trade.'' This, by definition, includes all relevant subsidies that
144 Alan Swinbank and Richard Tranter, Decoupling EU Farm Support: Does the New Single Payment
Scheme Fit within the Green Box?, 6 ESTEY CENTREJ. INT'LL. & TRADE POL'Y 47, 55 (2005); Josling
& Tangermann, supra note 140, at 381.
145 Swinbank & Tranter, supra note 144, at 50.
146 Domestic Support in Agriculture: the Boxes, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Oct. 1, 2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agrice/agboxes-e.pdf.
147 Brink, supra note 141, at 4.
148 UNDERSTANDING TIlEWTO, supra note 36, at 29.
149 DANA, supra note 46, at 10.
150 Josling & Tangermann, supra note 140, at 377.
151 Domestic Support in Agriculture, supra note 146.
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are not in either the blue or green boxes, so unless a country is able to argue that
a specific subsidy belongs in either of the others, it is in the amber box.
Subsidies in this box are limited and must be de minimis, which is mathematically
determined.5 2 Unlike the other boxes, this percentage relates to a Total
Aggregate Measure of Support, which "includes all supports for specified
products together with supports that are not for specific products, in one single
figure."'5 3 This means that for developing countries, the support is limited to 10
percent or less and for developed countries, 5 percent or less."s
2. The Agreement on Agriculture does not apply to
renewable energy.
The Agreement on Agriculture's scope is limited, and this severely impacts
its applicability to renewable energy. It focuses on agricultural products and
production rather than agriculture as an industry in general.' As such, it
distinguishes between support programs that directly stimulate production and
those that do not.5 6 This does not mean, however, that the Agreement on
Agriculture is only applicable to direct producers. Past WTO precedent indicates
that when financial support "passes through" a non-producer to benefit the
direct producer, Agreement on Agriculture analysis can be appropriate.57 This is
important for research and development programs that receive government
support. Research and development programs that involve direct payments to
producers or processors are allowed "if the payments are part of 'a clearly
defined environmental or conservation [program],' and if the payments are
limited to producers' extra out-of-pocket or loss-of-income costs of participating
in the program."' 8
Procedurally, it is impossible for countries to "reclassify" their renewable
energy subsidies as permissible under the Agreement on Agriculture during the
WTO dispute process. WTO members must provide the WTO Committee on
Agriculture with an annual accounting of their relevant domestic support under
the Agreement on Agriculture. 59 A country could therefore not claim that
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 The Agreement on Agriculture focuses on tariffs, domestic support of production, and exports.
These categories involve products and production. UNDERSTANDING TIHE WTO, supra note 36, at
28.
156 Id.
157 Lee, spra note 55, at 77.
158 DANA, supra note 46, at 10 (citing Agreement on Agriculture at Annex 2 12).
159 Effland, supra note 136, at 3.
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certain subsidies were protected by the Agreement on Agriculture if they had not
previously included these expenditures in the report it submitted to the
Committee."6°
The Agreement on Agriculture tends to be construed relatively literally, so
textualism is important. 6' Arguments related to the Agreement on Agriculture
must be rooted in the text. However, the text is limited, especially as it relates to
newer technologies that did not exist at the time of its creation. For example,
"[a]lthough not technically 'green box' payments, payments to producers of
cellulosic ethanol are not limited by the GATT/WTO framework because
animal and plant wastes are not agricultural commodities that are the subject of
international trade."' 62 This is the type of issue that would likely be addressed in
a future iteration of the Agreement on Agriculture, but for now member states
must apply the text of the current Agreement on Agriculture as it was initially
adopted.
B. A Renewable Energy Model
An agreement on renewable energy could model itself after the Agreement
on Agriculture. Much like agriculture, renewable energy is an important industry
that requires special protection to flourish. Indeed, before the creation of the
Agreement on Agriculture, while the original GATT applied to agricultural trade,
it contained loopholes that distorted the market.'63 The WTO describes the
Uruguay Round as "a significant first step towards order, fair competition and a
less distorted sector."'' "6 The box system of the Agreement on Agriculture
reflects different types of agricultural support, favoring those that distort trade
the least, and also allows room for distinguishing between developed and
developing countries.
1. A comparison of the agricultural and renewable energy industries.
A key difference is the role of the markets in member nations' economies.
Agriculture occupies a unique role in trade because of the domestic importance
of food supply and providing support to farmers and those who live in rural
areas. '6 Renewable energy is important because of the global demand for energy
coupled with a desire to protect the environment. Therefore, while the
160 When analyzing these subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture, this Comment will assume
that the countries would follow these procedural requirements.
161 DANA, supra note 46, at 1.
162 Id.
163 UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, spra note 36, at 26.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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Agreement on Agriculture may be instructive to formulating a model for an
agreement on renewable energy, it should not necessarily be adopted pro forma.
Instead, any agreement must take into consideration the purposes of each of the
Agreement on Agriculture's decisions and how that translates to renewable
energy.
2. A renewable energy box method.
Because the blue box is the most permissive program, it should include
policies that the WTO would most like countries to adopt. This would likely
include the policies that are least restrictive on trade and distort markets the
least. Programs that are mainly focused on the environment but still have an
economic impact could be blue box programs, like the program in US-Shrimp
that aimed to protect sea turtles. The blue box could also distinguish between
developed countries and developing counties, allowing developing countries to
allocate more of their resources because of both their incredibly high need for
low-cost energy and their limited existing energy infrastructure, a distinction
already present in the Agreement on Agriculture. Such a distinction encourages
compliance with the WTO by developing countries, as they can meet their
countries' unique needs and still comply with global norms.
The second-most permissive box, the green box, could encompass
programs that have a significant benefit for the environment but have an
industrial focus. China's Ride the Wind program would not qualify for the
Agreement on Agriculture green box because its subsidies were grounded in
industial goals. Under these criteria, it would, however, satisfy the requirements
of the renewable energy green box. This adjustment is significant because
encouraging renewable energy programs that benefit the environment is
important even if that is not the main goal of the subsidy. This distinction again
helps encourage compliance by developing countries. If needed, there could also
be a more permissive allowance for developing countries to further this goal.
The amber box of renewable energy would include programs that only
tangentially help the environment or disproportionately affect trade. If a subsidy
distorts trade far beyond its renewable energy benefits, it would be limited in
much the same way that extremely trade-distorting amber box programs in the
Agreement on Agriculture are. This classification would prevent countries from
attempting to disguise otherwise impermissible subsidies as renewable energy
subsidies in order to avoid a challenge by other member states.
C. Barriers to an Agreement
The global need for renewable energy may be in tension with the WTO's
general goals for free trade. If domestic subsidization increases the amount of
renewable energy available and keeps costs lower, even if it distorts trade, these
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interests become deeply conflicted. The inability to reconcile these goals may
prevent the WTO from creating a coherent way to deal with the status quo.
There may also be difficulties in creating such an agreement because of the
amount of information countries must give the WTO to calculate percentage-
based box classifications. For the Agreement on Agriculture to function,
member states must give the WTO Committee on Agriculture an annual
accounting of their relevant domestic support under the Agreement on
Agriculture. 6 Creating such a committee for renewable energy and mandating
that member states hand over this type of information is a serious challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment shows the difficulties in attempting to find exceptions for
renewable energy under the existing GATT framework. While Article XX has a
stated environmental exception, the "necessary" requirement and its chapeau's
restrictive language limit its applicability. This is significant because it curtails the
ability of developing countries to increase their investments in renewable energy
technology without running afoul of WTO rules if it is tied to industrial
development, whereas developed countries are more easily able to do so by
focusing on environmental protection alone.
This Comment therefore calls for a new solution, a WTO agreement that
specifically addresses the unique concerns of the renewable energy industry.
Indeed, while the current GATT provides helpful guidelines for a number of
specific industries and areas of international trade law, renewable energy is not
one of them. Trying to fit renewable energy into the patchwork of other rules is
difficult and does not resolve the unique challenges this industry faces. Outside
of Article XX, the WTO has not spoken on the important balance between
environmental protection and the preservation of free trade. Exceptions under
Article XX are also limited because of the chapeau that does not allow disguised
restrictions or favoring domestic over foreign products. It is likely that any such
program that would be otherwise disallowed but permitted under the Article XX
would have to be genuinely and singularly meant for environmental protection.
Article XX(b)'s "necessary" language is also a problem, as defining what GATT-
compliant measures it could be reasonably expected to use instead is
problematic when the goal is environmental protection. 167
If the WTO fails to create a viable agreement, the result will be the
continued manipulation of the current system because of GATT's relatively
toothless enforcement mechanism. Because the punishment for impermissible
166 Effland, suopra note 136, at 3.
167 See United States-Section 337, supra note 77, 5.26.
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subsidies is simply requiring that countries withdraw them, countries like China
are able to develop programs that give their domestic industries a boost and then
withdraw them when other countries consider bringing a claim. The current
system does not help the renewable energy industry, other member nations who
abide by the rules, or the credibility of the GATT in general.
While developed countries such as the United States could align their
"altruistic" programs that aim to protect the environment through the use of
renewable energies with Article XX's strict requirements, this does not address
the unique concerns of developing countries. Under this current regime, because
of China's status as a developing country still focused on economic expansion, it
is not likely to ever find an exception in this current scheme that is geared
towards environmental protection alone.
By creating a new, targeted agreement focused on renewable energy
modeled on the Agreement on Agriculture's box system, the \WTO could
balance member states' desire to promote free trade as much as possible with
the increasing demands for inexpensive energy, as well as the different needs of
developed and developing member states. This could improve compliance with
WTO agreements and help legitimize the WTO's role in addressing the
problems of the twenty-first century.
Winter 2014
Hildreth
CJIL
